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Picking apart the PCCs:
Two-part review of the 
role of police, fire and 
crime commissioners
Professor Pete Murphy and Research 
Associate Katarzyna Lakoma, Nottingham 
Trent University, report on the areas to be 
covered under the review of PCCs
“Malthouse claimed that the Conservative manifesto 
committed them to strengthening the accountability of PCCs 
and expanding their role”
A
s might be expected, the government’s plans to 
bring individual fire and rescue services under 
the control of police and crime commissioners 
has been met with a certain level of resistance.
On the day that parliament recessed for the Summer, 
Kit Malthouse, the Minister of State for Crime, Policing 
and the Fire Service, deposited a ministerial statement 
(2020) announcing a two-part internal review of police 
and crime commissioners (PCCs) and police, fire and 
crime commissioners (PFCCs). The first part is to report 
by October, thus allowing only the minimum 12 weeks for 
consideration under the government’s Code of Practice on 
Consultation. The statement informed us that an advisory 
group will support part one of the review, comprising 
senior external stakeholders with expertise in the policing 
and fire sectors. To elicit the public’s views the review team 
will ‘seek to engage a sample of citizens and local and 
national victims’ groups as appropriate’.
This hardly matches the spirit of the government’s own 
code of practice which states that consultations:
‘should normally last for at least 12 weeks with 
consideration given to longer timescales where 
feasible and sensible… Consultation documents 
should be clear about the consultation process, what 
is being proposed, the scope to influence and the 
expected costs and benefits of the proposals’. 
Malthouse claimed that the Conservative manifesto 
committed them to strengthening the accountability of 
PCCs and expanding their role. It must be Theresa May’s 
manifesto in 2017 that he must be referring to as neither 
PCCs nor PFCCs are mentioned in the 2019 Johnson 
version.
Notwithstanding these procedural inadequacies what is 
being proposed?
A two-part Internal Review
Part one commenced in July and is to report to the Home 
Secretary and Malthouse by the end of this month. 
It is focussed on changes required to strengthen the 
Commissioner model can be delivered ahead of the 
2021 PCC elections. In particular, it will consider how to 
strengthen the accountability, resilience, legitimacy and 
scrutiny mechanisms of the existing model and these are 
the focus of our interest in this article.
The government will also use part one of the review to 
articulate a longer-term ambition for the expansion of the 
PCC role. Part two will commence after the 2021 elections 
and will consider further ways to strengthen and expand the 
role of PCCs. ‘It will focus on longer-term reforms and the 
potential for wider efficiencies to be made within the system’ 
with a view to implementation ahead of the 2024 elections.
Fire and Rescue Services
The statement acknowledges that further reform of fire 
and rescue services is required in order to respond to the 
recommendations from Phase 1 of the Grenfell Tower 
Inquiry and to build on the findings from Sir Tom Winsor’s 
State of Fire report, both of which ‘demonstrate the clear 
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challenges and improvements required in professionalism, 
people and governance’. 
The review will also draw ‘lessons from the first cycle 
of fire governance transfers to PCCs’ and align with the 
government’s commitment to expand the benefits of 
devolution across England suggesting mayors of combined 
authorities should have ‘the ability to drive public safety, 
as well as economic growth and local recovery’. The 
government plan to develop the role of PCCs ‘with this 
longer-term trajectory in mind, building on the models in 
London and Greater Manchester’, although neither part of 
the review will consider a wholly new governance model nor 
examine the 43 police force model. Although there was no 
assurance given on the Fire Service model, given that closer 
collaboration is a statutory requirement in Chapter 1 of the 
2017 Act and the advantages of coterminous boundaries, 
this arrangement looks secure, at least in the short-term. 
What could they do to strengthen accountability, 
resilience, legitimacy and scrutiny and which are feasible 
in the short-term? 
All these issues are clearly interrelated and any changes 
in one often affects one or more of the others and they 
could all be affected by the recommendations in the State 
of Fire report. 
We will try to unpick them individually before 
addressing some issues that affect them all.
Accountability 
The key question to ask with accountability is always: 
accountability to whom? Is it to the public, to the 
government or to key stakeholders, collaborators, and/
or partners? The 2017 Act made accountability to central 
government, collaborators and partners stronger than 
the previous regime and on balance also enhanced 
accountability to the public, primarily though the creation 
of HMICFRS. But accountability was at a very low base 
and it is generally accepted that the PCC/PFCC model 
is still one of the weakest governance models in terms of 
accountability. It needs further strengthening. 
In terms of accountability to government, there are 
direct and indirect mechanisms available. Malthouse 
recently announced that the Police Reform and 
Transformation Board intended to implement the 2025 
Vision, which was chaired by a PCC on behalf of the 
APCC and will be replaced with a ‘Strategic Change and 
Investment Board’ to be chaired by himself in order to take 
a tighter grip on resources. The APCC has not been seen 
to be as robust in standing up to the Home Office as the 
local government-based Association of Police Authorities 
which it replaced in the high level tripartite arrangements 
operating prior to 2010 (Murphy et al. 2019). 
Indirectly, Sir Tom Winsor’s four high level 
recommendations in the State of Fire report will help 
accountability to government as well as to the public and 
stakeholders, although none of his proposals are likely to 
be fully delivered before the 2021 election, and the devil 
may be in the detail which is still to be revealed.
The government clearly want to see more PFCCs, but 
from the ‘local cases’ approved to date it is difficult to see 
how this ‘benchmark’ could be lower. They could grant 
powers for ministers to approve new PFCCs without a local 
case (but this would take time and be an act of political 
nepotism) or they could adopt the strong-arm tactics and 
coerce proposals much as MHCLG ministers are taking to 
the two-tier local government arrangements. The Home 
Office is probably tempted but either way they are not likely 
to be able to do either in time for 2021 elections.
More realistically short-term improvements in 
accountability are more likely to come from stronger scrutiny 
and improving financial and organisational resilience.
Resilience 
There are also various types of resilience. There is 
organisational and sectoral resilience, community 
resilience, financial resilience and the resilience of 
individuals and groups of firefighters doing their day job.
Winsor’s recommendations that the Home Office clarify 
the roles of the Service and of firefighters, and that the 
sector reviews the case for ‘fundamental reform’ of the 
pay negotiating machinery should help – providing, as the 
NFCC say, the former is risk and evidence-based rather 
than merely a lists of activities. Giving chief fire officers 
operational independence should also help the Service, 
but like the fundamental reform of pay negotiations, other 
than making announcements these are not likely to be 
implemented prior to May 2021. 
CIPFA have recently started to develop a definition 
of ‘financial resilience’ but the concept needs to be 
operationalised in the new public audit and assurance 
regime emerging from the Redmond Review while 
following the 2020 Code of Local Audit Practice (NAO 
2020). In our view, an opinion on financial ‘sustainability’ 
and an assessment of financial resilience is likely to be 
in the new audit and assurance arrangements and in the 
value for money assessments following Redmond. 
Although Covid-19 has forced the government to 
announce the end of ‘austerity’, are fire services likely 
to get more resources, be relieved of some current 
responsibilities and given the discretion to respond to 
local priorities? 
Medium- and longer-term financial resilience is 
dependent on both a multi-year Spending Review and 
reform of local authority financial support to allow 
resource allocations to respond to local circumstances, 
changing risk patterns and priorities. The autumn 
Spending Review has been delayed and although it cannot 
be postponed indefinitely, all the indications are that it will 
be short-term and responsive with fundamental reform 
kicked into the long grass of Covid-19 and Brexit. Recent 
spending announcements have also seen increased use 
of ‘special’ rather than more general revenue grant. This 
reduces local discretion and the flexibility of authorities to 
“The government will also use part one of the review to articulate a 
longer-term ambition for the expansion of the PCC role”
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respond to local priorities. It increases the proportion of 
hypothecation in local spending. 
Legitimacy
Legitimacy is the result of the relationship between the 
fire and rescue authorities and the public. In a democracy 
it is arbitrated through the law and the representational 
government at national and local levels. 
In England, directly elected politicians (central 
government), following appropriate consultation, 
determine the regime that guides the Fire and Rescue 
Service provision. It is currently articulated in the 2018 
National Framework for Fire and Rescue Services. The 
framework is implemented by a combination of directly 
and indirectly elected representatives (PFCCs and fire 
authorities respectively) and key stakeholders, such as 
HMICFRS, the NFCC and the National Standards Board, 
in addition to fire and rescue services. 
There are four potential ways of improving legitimacy. 
One is improving democratic legitimacy and the woefully 
low electoral turnout, particularly for PCCs. Another is to 
improve the diversity of the Service so that it better reflects 
the diversity of the community it serves. 
A third would be to improve the existing national 
framework, eg with the findings from the Grenfell 
Tower Inquiry Phase 1 and recommendations from the 
State of Fire report, which the government has already 
acknowledged it will do. Some of the latter could be 
addressed if a new framework is published prior to the 
PFCC elections in May 2021.
The fourth would be to improve the damaged reputation 
of the government, employees and employers by revisiting 
pay negotiations following recent bad publicity. This 
though would require reform of employment arrangements 
with potentially a new independent pay body. Winsor 
would also like a code of ethics, to establish exemplary 
standards of behaviour for staff by December 2020. Neither 
now seems realistic in the short-term. 
It may be possible to incorporate some improvements 
from Grenfell and the State of Fire before May 2021 as these 
reports have been out for some time, and the Home Office 
will have been working on them, but recent experience 
suggests that improving democratic legitimacy, equality 
and diversity, and industrial relations within the sector are 
going to be a much tougher ask.
Scrutiny
Effective internal and external scrutiny plays a vital 
role in securing the efficient delivery of fire and rescue 
services and driving improvement within the Service. 
Organisational awareness and self-assessment are the 
foundation of effective improvement. They require robust 
internal scrutiny and effective performance management. 
Neither was evident from the recent round of inspections. 
External scrutiny is now primarily delivered through 
HMICFRS service inspections and public audit 
arrangements. Fire Service audit arrangements are part of 
the wider Review of Local Authority Financial Reporting 
and External Audit which has just been published 
(Redmond 2020).
Redmond proposes radical changes to the public audit 
arrangements and organisational responsibilities and the 
assessments of financial resilience and organisational 
sustainability. If implemented, it would significantly 
improve public audit, accountability and transparency, but 
key areas require primary and/or secondary legislation and 
will not be in place by May 2021.
We have previously advocated more comprehensive 
and sophisticated external inspection to embrace 
governance, strategy and external collaborations. We have 
also called for thematic or cross cutting inspections by 
HMICFRS to complement service inspection and facilitate 
sectoral improvement.
It is, however, also evident that internal scrutiny 
arrangement, particularly for PCCs and PFCCs, should be 
strengthened as part of the governance arrangements. 
The PFCCs and fire authorities must ensure that police 
and fire and rescue services are adequately resourced. 
This means scrutiny must be adequately resourced. Police, 
fire and crime panels either need strengthening with fire 
expertise or a specialist panel established (with or without 
external independent representation). Each fire service 
should have a strategic collaboration board to periodically 
review work between the police and fire services and which 
should be included within the inspection arrangements. 
Changes to the inspection regime can come from the 
Secretary of State or directly from HMICFRS and external 
scrutiny expertise is available from CIPFA, the Centre for 
Public Scrutiny and specialist management consultants.
We have mentioned that accountability, resilience, 
legitimacy and scrutiny all overlap and are interdependent 
of each other. They are all underpinned by transparency and 
should be founded on data and intelligence. All parties now 
seem to accept these need to be continuously improved.
The first phase of the review could see the translation 
of some of the much-needed lessons from Grenfell and 
Winsor into action. If relatively small amounts of additional 
resources are made available, it could see the welcome 
acceleration of the NFCC programme on community 
risks and the work of the Standards Board. It might see a 
new national framework and minor amendments to the 
second round of inspections. However, its most significant 
contribution is more likely to be what it reveals about the 
government’s ambitions for the longer-term and more 
fundamental reforms of the Service. 
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